Suriname, Guyana and Venezuela triad

Regional dynamics in three Guayanas: the oil fields of Suriname, Guyana, and Venezuela, while not on the same geological plate, are critically interconnected through shared economic, geopolitical, and humanitarian challenges. The boundary between the Caribbean plate and the South American plate, lies along a complex tectonic transition zone in northern Venezuela. Moreover, the Guayana shield, a distinct geological formation, underlies Suriname, Guyana and the right shore of Orinoco River in southeastern Venezuela. The Caribbean plate includes Venezuela's northern coastal regions: such as the Maracaibo basin, but does not extend as far south as Anzoátegui and Monagas states which are situated on the South American plate. The Guyana shield, part of the South American plate, extends northward from the Amazon basin to Suriname, Guyana and the right shore of Orinoco River in southeastern Venezuela. 

Recent offshore discoveries in Stabroek block and block 58 are situated in the Guyana Shield. Chevron's license expiration on May 27th, 2025 threatens 15,000 jobs in Venezuela, exacerbating regional tensions during the May 25th parliamentary elections. However, the implications extend into the oil rich triad, influencing Suriname's emerging oil sector: driven by Staatsolie recent discovery in the offshore block 58, and Guyana's oil boom led by Exxon Mobil in Stabroek block, which promises economic growth but also social challenges. China's belt and road initiative, Iran's barter system and Russia's strategic support shape outcomes across the triad: with each country navigating these influences differently. 

The Guayana Esequiba dispute between Venezuela and Guyana, alongside the Tigri dispute between Suriname and Guyana demand resolution: while the migration crisis affects all three nations, with Venezuela as the primary source and Suriname and Guyana as host countries. We will explore these dynamics focusing on economic impacts, strategic investments, legal pathways and humanitarian responses with implications for regional stability and international relations. Expectations from Suriname include stabilizing its nascent oil industry amidst political risks, particularly in the context of the Tigri dispute. Guyana anticipates economic growth, tempered by migration and territorial disputes with both Venezuela and Suriname. Venezuela's crisis meanwhile risks regional spillover, necessitating a triad focused approach. 

Let's address now Chevron's exit and oil workers. Chevron's potential exit, following the license expiration on May 27th, 2025 poses a significant threat to Venezuela's economic stability, particularly in oil rich areas like Zulia, Anzoátegui, and Monagas. This event occurring around the May 25th, 2025 parliamentary and governor elections exacerbates the urgency of maintaining economic viability. The impact is profound: with approximately 15,000 Venezuelan oil workers facing potential unemployment. These workers are distributed across various roles: office staff, field workers, engineers, transport operators, and blue collar positions are crucial to the local economy. Their spending habits support businesses from groceries to services, contributing to regional economic activity. The loss of Chevron's operations could reduce local GDP in Maracaibo, Zulia by an estimated 2% or 3% in the short term: highlighting the broader economic ripple effects. 

Suriname's oil sector managed by Staatsolie presents a different landscape. Recent discoveries in the offshore block 58 operated by Total Energies and Apache Corporation have positioned Suriname as an emerging player, with potential to absorb some skilled labor from Venezuela. However, Staatsolie's capacity is limited. Political stability concerns persist, as noted by the energy information administration on May 1st, 2025. Working conditions in Suriname's oil fields are characterized by stringent safety regulations, and higher wages compared to Venezuela, but face challenges like labor shortages and environmental risks. The government's focus on sustainable development, as outlined in a recent policy document from the Ministry of Natural Resources, aims to mitigate these issues. The influx of Venezuelan workers could strain resources, particularly in regions like Nickerie and Coronie where infrastructure is developing. 

Guyana's oil boom driven by Exxon Mobile offers opportunities, but also complicates integration regions like Barima Waini and Upper Takutu Upper Esakibbo, where oil infrastructure is developing, experiencing social tensions from Venezuelan migration. Working conditions in Guyana's oil fields, particularly in the Stabroek Block, are marked by high safety standards and significant foreign investment, but face challenges like maritime rights, disputes, and infrastructure development lags. The government strategy, as detailed in a recent Exxon Mobil partnership report, emphasizes local content and indigenous inclusion, but tensions persist, particularly in indigenous areas like Region One Barima Waini. 

Venezuelan migrants typically seek work away from the border and farther into Colombia. in cities like Medellín, Bogotá and Barranquilla. Recent reports suggest that Maicao in La Guajira department in Colombia, bordering Zulia state in Venezuela, is increasingly receiving commerce due to the indigenous populations Wayúu and Yupka, who can cross borders effortlessly. This contrasts from formal customs widespread between Norte de Santander department in Colombia and Táchira state in Venezuela. 

China's economic role in the region, particularly through the belt and road incentive, has significantly shaped the oil rich triads dynamics in Guyana. China's belt and road incentive has investments particularly the Linden to Lethem road agreed upon in July 2023, and costing approximately $1.5 billion. It supports economic growth but risks debt traps. This project is managed by Chinese state owned enterprises. It enhances connectivity between coastal and interior regions, facilitating oil transport and trade: but raises concerns about sovereignty as China's collateral includes project revenues rather than natural resources, as noted by World Bank on April 30th, 2025. The road's development aims to integrate Guyana's oil economy with regional markets, and the Brazilian border, but environmental impacts and land rights issues persist: particularly in indigenous areas. 

In Suriname, the oil sector attracts belt and road initiative funding: with projects like the expansion of the port of Paramaribo, and oil field developments with investments around $500 million by 2025. This investment is facilitated by China National Petroleum Corporation CNPC, focusing on critical infrastructure. It enhances connectivity but risks debt accumulation. The port of Paramaribo expansion is aimed at supporting offshore oil exports. It faces challenges like environmental degradation and social displacement, as reported by the Jamaica Observer on May 15th, 2025. The government's strategy, outlined in recent policy documents from the Ministry of Public Works, seeks to balance economic growth with sustainability. But the influx of Chinese labor and technology raises concerns about local control, particularly in regions like Nickerie and Coronie. 

China's economic role in Venezuela, with over $60 billion in loans since 2007, has significantly impacted sovereignty: by ceding resource control and reinforcing Nicolás Maduro's government. The terms of these loans, with interest rates one or 2% above Libor and 20 year repayment periods, prioritize oil exports: hindering diversification and exacerbating economic dependence, as analyzed by the Economic Intelligence Unit on May 1st, 2025. The Chevron exit creates opportunities for China to expand its influence, threatening United States interests and the 15,000 American jobs associated with Chevron's operations. China's belt and road initiative aligns with this investment, enhancing connectivity but raising debt concerns in Venezuela. 

Belt and road initiative projects include infrastructure development like ports and railways: crucial for oil export routes. But these projects often face delays due to sanctions and operational challenges. The interplay of these investments across the triad highlights China's role in shaping regional dynamics. In Venezuela, the Belt & Road initiatives focus on energy security and reinforces Nicolás Maduro's government. Belt & Road initiatives potentially lead to increased Chinese control over oil resources ahead of a May 25th, 2025 elections. In Guyana, the belt and road initiative supports oil driven growth. But the Guayana Esequiba dispute complicates dynamics, with China's indirect support for regional stability influencing outcomes. 

In Suriname the belt road initiative's emphasis on infrastructure development, aligns with oil sector growth: but political risks and environmental concerns persist. The interplay of these investments across the triad highlights China's role in shaping regional dynamics, particularly in the context of the Tigri dispute since annexation by Guyana. Iran's barter system with Venezuela, exchanging oil for goods like food and medicine, offers limited relief amidst sanctions and economic instability. The system is operational since the early 2000s. It saw agreements in June 2015 to fund joint investments: but volumes remain small, around 10,000 barrels per day by 2025, constrained by logical challenges and covert operations. 

Potential for trade settlements in rubles or yuan via BRICS+ payment systems, like Russia's system for transfer of financial messages, and China's crossborder interbank payment system, is theoretically possible: with China's crossborder interbank payment handling over $20 trillion annually by 2025, supporting yuan trade in Venezuela. Iran's barter system is often criticized for substandard goods and lack of transparency, fueling corruption concerns. The BRICS+ framework, while theoretically supportive, faces practical challenges due to Venezuela's exclusion from global financial networks. China's crossborder interbank payment systems dominance in yuan trade, is not fully accessible due to sanctions. Russia's economic investments, though scaled back, maintain political leverage with 17 billion dollars in debt by 2023, serviced through oil as reported by the Carnegie endowment on July 15th 2023.

In Suriname there is some Iranian interest in oil sector collaboration. Though minimal, it could expand with belt and road initiative alignments, while Russia's focus remains diplomatic. The government's strategy is outlined in recent policy documents, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeking to balance economic growth with sustainability. But the influx of Iranian technology and labor raises concerns about local control, particularly in the context of the Tigri dispute. The port of Paramaribo expansion is aimed at supporting offshore oil exports, facing challenges like environmental degradation and social displacement. 

Guyana's economic ties with Russia, though limited, include historical mining interests with potential for renewed engagement. The government's focus on diversifying the economy, particularly in the oil sector, aims to mitigate these risks, but political tensions persist, particularly in the context of the Guayana Esequiba dispute. 

CITGO has been under PDVSA's control since the 1980s. It became a United States based refiner, but ownership is contested post 2019 sanctions. The Venezuelan government claims it as a Venezuelan asset, accusing Dinorah Figuera, president of the extinct 2015 Venezuelan National Assembly of theft. The 2015 assembly expired in 2020, arguing for protection from mismanagement. The May 25th, 2025 elections for a new national assembly until 2030 could influence resolution, with the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes and United States courts key amidst international legal frameworks in the 1980s. Citgo's acquisition by Pdvsa transformed it into a major United States refiner, with assets valued at over $10 billion by 2025 despite sanctions. The ownership dispute escalated post 2019, with Venezuelan government seizing control leading to legal battles in United States courts, where the opposition led until 2023 and sought to protect Citgo from mismanagement. 

The 2015 Assembly, recognized by the United States until its expiration, argued for Citgo's protection, but Venezuelan government's control persisted with accusations of theft against Figuera, president of such 2015Assebly. The May 25th, 2025 elections could shift these dynamics, with a new national assembly potentially altering Venezuela stance: either reinforcing Venezuelan government's claims or opening avenues for resolution. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, an institution established under the World Bank to handle investment disputes, plays a crucial role with ongoing arbitration cases, potentially affecting Venezuela's international standing. United States courts where creditors seek repayment are also critical, with decisions potentially influencing Venezuela's international standing.

In Suriname, legal frameworks around oil exploitation, influenced by Chinese investments require diplomatic navigation: particularly with Venezuela's claims affecting regional stability. The government's strategy, outlined in recent policy documents from the Ministry of Justice and Police, emphasizes sustainable development and indigenous rights. But the Tigri dispute with Guyana complicates matters. The expansion of the port of Paramaribo is aimed at supporting offshore oil exports, faces challenges like environmental degradation and social displacement, particularly in indigenous areas. 

Guyana's legal arguments, supported by the International Court of Justice 2023 ruling rejected by Venezuela, necessitate continued diplomatic engagement: with community of Latin American and Caribbean states role critical, amidst the Guayana Esequiba governor elections. The potential resolution of Citgo's disputes, amidst the Chevron crisis requires regional cooperation, with Suriname's emerging oil sector and Guyana's strategic interests at stake. 

Russian influence in Venezuela remains a significant factor in the country's political and economic landscape, despite some fluctuations in the intensity of this relationship over the years. Russia's engagement with Venezuela dates back to the early 2000s, particularly during the presidency of Hugo Chavez, who sought to diversify Venezuela's international alliances away from the United States. This relationship intensified under Nicolás Maduro, especially after the imposition of United States sanctions in 2019: which pushed Venezuela closer to Russia, China, and other nonwestern powers. Russia has maintained a military presence in Venezuela, though it has been more symbolic than substantial in recent years. In 2024, Russia deployed warships to the Caribbean, including waters near Venezuela, as part of a broader strategy to assert influence in the region. This deployment was seen as a response to United States activities and a show of support for Maduro ahead of the July 2024 presidential elections which were marred by controversy and allegations of fraud. 

Historically, Russia has been a major arms supplier to Venezuela, providing equipment like S300 air defense systems and TU60 bombers. The scale of these sales has diminished due to Venezuela's economic crisis and inability to pay. There is elucubration that four Conviasa airplanes returned from Moscow victory day in May 2025 with additional weaponry. Training and maintenance support continue, but at a reduced level. There have been reports of Russian mercenaries, such as those from the Wagner group operating in Venezuela. Their numbers and activities have decreased since the group's reorganization, following Prigoim's death in 2023. 

Russia has been a key player in Venezuela's oil sector, with companies like Rosneft investing heavily before the sanctions era. However, these investments have been scaled back: due to financial risks and United States pressure. As of 2025, Russia continues to buy Venezuelan oil, often through intermediaries to circumvent sanctions. Russia has provided loans to Venezuela, often secured by future oil deliveries, but the repayment of these loans has been problematic due to Venezuela's economic struggles. The debt to Russia is estimated at around $17 billion as of 2023, with little progress on repayment. The decision by the United States to not extending severance license beyond May 27th, 2025 could theoretically open doors for Russian companies to reenter the oil sector. 

Venezuelan business community's alarm over Chevron's exit underscores the desperation for foreign investment, but Russia's capacity to fill this gap is limited. Russia has consistently supported the Venezuelan government, including during the 2024 presidential elections where it along with China vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for new elections. This support is part of a broader strategy to counter western influence, and maintain alliances with authoritarian regimes. Russia has defended Venezuela in international fora: arguing against United States sanctions and intervention, framing its stance as a defense of sovereignty. 

The upcoming parliamentary and governor elections on May 25th, 2025 are a critical juncture, where Russian influence could play a role, though indirectly. Russia's support for the Venezuelan government likely emboldens the Venezuelan government to manipulate the electoral process. As seen in past elections, the arrests of opposition figures like Juan Pablo Guanipa on May 23rd, 2025 may be partly influenced by the government's need to maintain control amidst Russian backing, ensuring a favorable outcome that aligns with Moscow's interests. Russia's presence in Venezuela is part of a broader strategy to challenge United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The potential withdrawal of Chevron creates an opportunity for China and Russia to expand their influence. Though Russia's role is currently more limited compared to China's economic investments, Russia has not taken a direct stance on Guayana Esequiba dispute, but benefits from the destruction it causes for United States policy. 

Despite international pressure, Venezuela is holding elections for Guyana Esequiba National Assembly representatives and governor, in Tumeremo, Bolívar state and other locations close to the arbitral award contested border. This could be indirectly supported by Russia's narrative of resisting Western interference. Looking ahead, Russia's influence in Venezuela is likely to remain, but its intensity may depend on global dynamics, particularly the outcome of the Ukraine conflict and United States policy shifts under the Trump administration. The economic benefits for Russia are diminishing due to Venezuela's inability to repay debts. But the political alliance serves strategic purposes, especially in countering United States sanctions and maintaining a foothold in Latin America. The Venezuelan future as Chevron exits increasingly lies with Russia, with significant challenges and limitations 

in Suriname Russia's role is minimal, with past mining investments declining. Strategic support for regional stability persists, particularly in the context of the Tigri dispute as stated by TASS on May 20th 2025. The government strategy, outlining recent policy documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seeks to balance economic growth with sustainability. The influx of Russian technology and labor raises concerns about local control. 

Guyana's economic ties with Russia, though limited, include historical mining interests with potential for renewed engagement, amidst the several crisis as reported by Demerara waves on May 23rd, 2025. The government's focus on diversifying the economy, particularly in the oil sector, aims to mitigate this risks, but political tensions persist. particularly in the context of the Guayana Esequba dispute. The interplay of these economic ties across the triad highlights the complex regional dynamics. In Venezuela, Russia's support is crucial for survival amidst sanctions. But in Suriname and Guayana, the influence is more diplomatic, with potential for economic collaboration amidst regional disputes.