Strategic exclusion of Marco Rubio
Dynamics of US foreign policy toward Venezuela in May 2025 reveal a complex interplay of ideological resistance, pragmatic diplomacy, and strategic coordination with the Trump administration. Central to this narrative is the absence of Secretary of State Marco Rubio from a critical White House briefing in Latin American policy on May 10th, 2025, while he was engaged in a bilateral meeting with Guyana officials in Miami. We shall explore the theatic significance of Rubio's exclusion, the synchronization between Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and special envoy Richard Grenell, Donald Trump's statements on regime change and United States priorities, and the implications for Chevron's operations in Venezuela. The analysis is organized to highlight the strategic maneuvers, policy shifts, and their broader impact on regional stability.
The strategic exclusion of Marco Rubio from White House briefing on Latin American policy is a pivotal moment in understanding the internal dynamics of the Trump administration's approach to Venezuela. Rubio as Secretary of State would typically be involved in such high level discussions, given his role in shaping foreign policy. However, secondary sources confirm his absence, noting that he was not listed among the attendees, which raises questions about his involvement in Venezuela policy. Rubio's X post at 9:15 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on May 10th, 2025 indicates he was in Miami for a bilateral meeting with Guyana officials discussing regional security. This timeline aligns precisely with the White House briefing, suggesting coincidence of these events. Rubio's engagement with Guyana, while Bessent and Grenell discussed Venezuela, potentially including Nicaragua and Cuba warrants closer examination.
The hypothesis that the White House meeting was deliberately scheduled to exclude Rubio is supported by the administration's internal tensions over Venezuela policy. Rubio's hardline stands against concessions to Nicolás Maduro. Evident in this expectation that Chevron's license would expire on May 27th, 2025 contrasts sharply with the pragmatic approaches of Bessent and Grenell. Bessent's oversight of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC, and Grenell's role as special envoy for Venezuela allow them to advance a policy of engagement, as seen in the May 21st, 2025 sanction removals and the May 20th, 2025 license extension, respectively. Rubio's absence from the briefing, where sanctions and diplomatic strategies were likely discussed, suggests a deliberate maneuver to marginalize his influence and allow Bessent and Grenell to pursue their agenda without opposition. This is further supported by the timing of Rubio's Miami meeting, which kept him occupied during a critical policy discussion.
The significance of Rubio's meeting with Guyana officials in Miami on May 10th, 2025 cannot be overstated. Guyana, a key player in the Caribbean and a potential US ally in regional security, has been a focal point for Rubio, due to its tensions with Venezuela over the Essequibo region. Rubio's March 2025 visit to Guyana, where he warned of Venezuelan aggression and emphasized the importance of democracy and security, underscores his focus on this relationship. Miami as a hub for Venezuelan American exiles, and Rubio's political base is a strategic location for such discussions, amplifying this message. Rubio's March 2025 visit to Guyana, where he warned of Venezuelan aggression and emphasized the importance of democracy and security, underscores his focus on this relationship.
The choice of Guyana from all possible countries is particularly noteworthy, given Guyana's potential role as a fighter in an eventual conflict with Venezuela. This meeting occurring simultaneously with the White House briefing on Venezuela, suggests a deliberate division of labor within the administration. While Bessant and Grenell focused on diplomatic engagements with Maduro, Rubio's engagement with Guyana reinforced a hardline stance: potentially preparing for regional conflict. This question of whether this is coincidence or purpose, leans towards the latter: given the strategic implications in the administration internal dynamics. The briefing's focus on sanctions and diplomacy, as reported by Reuters on May 11th, 2025 sets the stage for the subsequent actions by Bessent and Grenell.
The exclusion of Rubio allowed for a policy shift toward pragmatism, evident in the May 21st, 2025 sanction removals on Alejandro Fleming Cabrera and Leonardo Gonzalez, and Grenell's fake news claim: denying an oil for deportees deal on the same day. This synchronization between Bessent and Grenell likely pre-planned during the May 10th briefing, contrasts with Rubio's ideological resistance, highlighting a strategic division within the administration. The implications for regional stability are profound, as Rubio's hardline approach might alienate allies like Guyana. In contrast, Bessent and Grenell's pragmatism risks concessions to Maduro, potentially undermining long-term security goals.
Guyana's role in this context extends beyond its geographical proximity to Venezuela. It is a critical player in the Caribbean's geopolitical landscape, particularly given the Essequibo dispute, which has escalated tensions and positioned Guyana as a potential ally for the United States, in countering Venezuelan aggression. Rubio's meeting with Guyana officials in Miami, a city symbolizing resistance to Maduro due to its large Venezuelan American population, underscores his strategy to bolster regional alliances against what he perceives as narco regime. This engagement illustrates a calculated exclusion rather than mere coincidence aimed at advancing different policy agendas within the administration.
Furthermore, the United States Guyana Security Cooperation facilitated through the United States Security Cooperation Office in Guyana, enhances this strategic alignment. The USSCO representing the United States Southern Command, provides military consultation and operational support to the Guyana Defense Force: focusing on foreign military sales, security assistance and theater security cooperation engagement activities. This cooperation ongoing since at least 2019 underscores Guyana's role as a key security partner, particularly in the context of perceived Venezuelan threats and alliance with Rubio's efforts to strengthen regional defenses against Maduro's government.
The synchronization between Bessent and Grenell extends beyond Venezuela to include other Latin American govenments such as Cuba, which was likely part of the May 10th, 2025 White House briefings agenda. United States Cuba relations, historically tense since Fidel Castro's ascent in 1959, have seen a thaw under Trump's second term, with pragmatic overtures aimed at securing migration agreements and countering Chinese influence in the region. On January 31st, 2025, Trump announced a humanitarian parole program for Cuban nationals alongside those from Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti to address illegal border crossings, reflecting a shift toward engagement rather than isolation. This policy overseen by Bessent. Secretary of Treasury, through sanctions adjustments. Grenell's diplomatic efforts aligned with their approach to Venezuela.
The May 10th briefing excluding Rubio likely discussed his intentions with Cuba, to facilitate broader regional stability contrasting with Rubio's hardline stance against both Maduro and the Castro regime. This coordinated effort evident in the subsequent actions like the May 21st, 2025 sanction removals suggests a strategic realignment of United States policy toward Latin America: prioritizing diplomatic outcomes over ideological conflicts. This synchronization between Bessant and Grenel is evident in the timing and nature of their actions, indicating a coordinated effort to manage public perception and avoid inflaming hardliners like Rubio.
Donald Trump's statements on regime change and United States priorities, as quoted by Grenell, further illuminate the administration's shift toward pragmatism. On February 28th, 2025, at a rally in Cleveland, Ohio, Trump stated, "We are not going to waste time on regime change. We're going to focus on what's best for America, jobs, energy, and security." This statement occurring early in his term, aligns with Grenell's narrative of prioritizing United States interests over ideological goals, like regime change in Venezuela. The context of the Ohio rally focusing on domestic issues and energy security underscores Trump's America first doctrine, which Grenell echoed in his May 20th 2025 interview on Bannon's war room on April 1st 2025 at Mar-a-Lago. It waws claimed that China is trying to take over Venezuela's oil We can't let that happen. It's not just about Venezuela. It's about protecting American jobs and energy security. As reported by Fox News, this statement made during a press conference with oil executives directly addresses Grenell's concern about preventing Chinese takeover, reflecting a pragmatic engagement with Maduro to secure United States economic interests.
On May 10th, 2025, Trump tweeted on Truth Social: "China wants Venezuela's oil badly. We're not going to let them have it. America first means securing our resources and jobs." This tweet coinciding with the White House briefing reinforces the priority of economic security over regime change. Aligning with Grenell's diplomacy, these statements, though not from Saudi Arabia, as Grenell suggested, provide ample context for his quotes, highlighting Trump's broader policy shift. Trump's approach to other authoritarian regimes such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, UAE, and Saudi Arabia can be extrapolated to Venezuela, reflecting a pragmatic engagement over ideological conflict.
During his 2025 meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Trump emphasized, "We are not here to change regimes. We are here to do business and protect American interests." As quoted by Reuters, this rhetoric focused on economic partnerships aligns with his approach to Maduro as seen in negotiations in March 2025 during visits to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Trump stated in Abu Dhabi, "We are not in the business of regime change. We are in the business of making America strong through alliances and trade as quoted by Al Jazeera.
This philosophy was articulated in a July 2024 interview with Tucker Carlson. "I want no enemies. Enemies are useful to grow and become stronger, but I would rather trade with them", underpinning his engagement with Maduro. As quoted by Tucker Carlson Network, on May 5th, 2025, Trump tweeted, "We are not going to fight endless wars or chase regime change. We are going to make deals that benefit America. Venezuela, like any other country, can be a partner if they play by our rules." As quoted on truth social, this broader approach prioritizing trade and security over ideology contrasts with Rubio's stance, making it a crucial theme.
The implications for Chevron's alterations in Venezuela are significant, given the strategic exclusion and policy synchronization. On May 15th, 2025, Chevron CEO Mike Worth told Reuters, "We are working closely with the United States government to navigate the current license expiration on May 27th, 2025. Our priority is to protect our investments and maintain operational continuity. As quoted by Reuters, this indicates ongoing negotiations, aligning with Grenell's May 20th, 2025 extension and contrasting with Rubio's expectation of expiration. No recent news on contract terminations, asset sales, or other verifiable transactions was found, suggesting Chevron's joint ventures like Petroboscan and Petroindependencia remain operational under general license framework for Chevron.
The stability in Chevron's operations, despite the internal policy divisions, underscores the administration's pragmatic approach to securing United States energy interests in Venezuela. It navigates the tensions between Rubio's hardline stance, and Bessent and Grenell's diplomatic engagement. This shift, evident in Trump's statements and the administration's actions, has profound implications for regional stability in the Caribbean, particularly in the context of Guyana's role and the United States Cuba relations, setting the stage for future policy developments. A spokeswoman for the state department stated that there is no confusion in foreign policy and that such foreign policy is directed by Marco Rubio. However, controversy still remains because OFAC licenses are provided by the Department of Treasury, and the Secretary of Treasury is Scott Bessett who has been working a strategy on Venezuela with Donald Trump and Richard Grenell.
Marco Rubio on purpose has decided not to meet with Nicolás Maduro and therefore is not well suited for United States policy in Venezuela. That is the reason why Donald Trump has sent special envoys to countries such as Iran, in the case of Witkoff, or Venezuela and North Korea in the case of Richard Grenell: they are better negotiators. Trump likes to have two opposing factions working simultaneously, to decide at the last minute which one will prevail. We should expect a statement from Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent at any time, considering that lobbying efforts from Chevron Corporation continue. We have four days left to settle the controversy on a possible Chevron's license renewal.
We have heard no word on ENI from Italy, or Repsol from Spain: which along with Chevron have been lobbying for renewal of their licenses. It sounds like petroleum services companies such as Schlumberger or Basker Hugges operations in Venezuela have officially been eliminated. We will see during the next few weeks how Chinese, Iranian, and Russian companies will quickly take over. Venezuelan population over time will align more with eastern hemisphere culture and economies, as those are the ones that will provide us support to continue our economic transactions.
Scott Bessent must clarify if he has the authority to issue or revoke OFAC licenses at his will, as demonstrated by the removal of sanctions to two Venezuelans tied to Maduro's government or if Scott Bessant will continue sanctioning the Venezuelan petroleum industry, knowing very well that China will take over, while Scott Bessett's central job in his tenure is to counter China. Therefore, the spokeswoman for the State Department is wrong when she says that the State Department is solely responsible for foreign policy, because the Treasury Department manages the economic implications of such foreign policy.
It seems that the Treasury Department and the State Department are working in confrontation. We are seeing constant changes of mind on a daily basis, which is not welcomed by the international community: which is slowly breaking apart from the United States which is seen as an unreliable partner which is no longer seen as an ally, or which is even being considered as an enemy: as happens in Venezuela. We welcome 100+ years of service of Chevron in our oil fields. But Marco Rubio just wants to destroy 100+ years of shared history.