Strategic exclusion of Marco Rubio

Strategic exclusion of Marco Rubio. The dynamics of US foreign policy toward Venezuela in May 2025 reveal a complex interplay of ideological resistance, pragmatic diplomacy, and strategic coordination with the Trump administration. Central to this narrative is the absence of Secretary of State Marco Rubio from a critical White House briefing in Latin American policy on May 10th, 2025 while he was engaged in a bilateral meeting with Guian officials in Miami. We shall explore the theatic significance of Rubio's exclusion, the synchronization between Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and special envoy Richard Grenle, Donald Trump's statements on regime change and United States priorities and the implications for Chevron's operations in Venezuela. The analysis is organized to highlight the strategic maneuvers, policy shifts, and their broader impact on regional stability. The strategic exclusion of Marco Rubio from May 10th, 2025 White House briefing on Latin American policy is a pivotal moment in understanding the internal dynamics of the Trump administration's approach to Venezuela. Rubio as Secretary of State would typically be involved in such high level discussions given his role in shaping foreign policy. However, secondary sources confirm his absence, noting that he was not listed among the attendees, which raises questions about his involvement in Venezuela policy. Rubio's exp post at 9:15 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on May 10th, 2025 indicates he was in Miami for a bilateral meeting with Guian officials discussing regional security. This timeline aligns precisely with the White House briefing suggesting coincidence of these events. Rubio's engagement with Guyana while Bessant and Grenell discussed Venezuela potentially including Nicaragua and Cuba warrants closer examination. The hypothesis that the White House meeting was deliberately scheduled to exclude Rubio is supported by the administration's internal tensions over Venezuela policy. Rubio's hardline stands against concessions to Nicholas Maduro. Evident in this expectation that Chevron's license would expire on May 27th, 2025 contrasts sharply with the pragmatic approaches of Bessant and Grenel. Bessent's oversight of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC, and Grenel's role as special envoy for Venezuela allow them to advance a policy of engagement as seen in the May 21st, 2025 sanction removals and the May 20th, 2025 license extension, respectively. Rubio's absence from the briefing where sanctions and diplomatic strategies were likely discussed suggests a deliberate maneuver to marginalize his influence and allow Bessant and Grenel to pursue their agenda without opposition. This is further supported by the timing of Rubio's Miami meeting which kept him occupied during a critical policy discussion. The significance of Rubio's meeting with Guan officials in Miami on May 10th, 2025 cannot be overstated. Guyana, a key player in the Caribbean and a potential ally in regional security, has been a focal point for Rubio due to its tensions with Venezuela over the Eekibbo region. Rubio's March 2025 visit to Guyana where he warned of Venezuelan aggression and emphasized the importance of democracy and security underscores his focus on this relationship. Miami as a hub for Venezuelan American exiles and Rubio's political base is a strategic location for such discussions amplifying this message. The significance of Rubio's meeting with Guan officials in Miami on May 10th, 2025 cannot be overstated. Guyana, a key player in the Caribbean and a potential ally in regional security, has been a focal point for Rubio due to its tensions with Venezuela over the Eekibbo region. Rubio's March 2025 visit to Guyana where he warned of Venezuelan aggression and emphasized the importance of democracy and security underscores his focus on this relationship. Miami as a hub for Venezuelan American exiles and Rubio's political base is a strategic location for such discussions amplifying his message. The choice of Guyana from all possible countries is particularly noteworthy given Guyana's potential role as a fighter in an eventual conflict with Venezuela. This meeting occurring simultaneously with the White House briefing on Venezuela suggests a deliberate division of labor within the administration. While Bessant and Grenel focused on diplomatic engagements with Maduro, Rubio's engagement with Guyana reinforced a hardline stance potentially preparing for regional conflict. This question of whether this is coincidence or purpose leans towards the latter given the strategic implications in the administration internal dynamics. The briefing's focus on sanctions and diplomacy as reported by Reuters on May 11th, 2025 sets the stage for the subsequent actions by Bessant and Greno. The exclusion of Rubio allowed for a policy shift toward pragmatism evident in the May 21st, 2025 sanction removals on Alejandro Fleming Cabrera and Leonardo Gonzalez Dean and Gren's fake news claim denying an oil for deportes deal on the same day. This synchronization between Bessant and Grenol likely pre-planned during the May 10th briefing contrasts with Rubio's ideological resistance, highlighting a strategic division within the administration. The implications for regional stability are profound as Rubio's hardline approach might alienate allies like Guyana. While Bessent and Grenel's pragmatism risks concessions to Maduro, potentially undermining long-term security goals. Guyana's role in this context extends beyond its geographical proximity to Venezuela. It is a critical player in the Caribbean's geopolitical landscape, particularly given the Eekibbo dispute, which has escalated tensions and positioned Guyana as a potential ally for the United States in countering Venezuelan aggression. Rubio's meeting with Guian officials in Miami, a city symbolizing resistance to Maduro due to its large Venezuelan American population, underscores his strategy to bolster regional alliances against what he perceives as Narco regime. This engagement occurring simultaneously with the White House's discussion of Venezuela highlights a deliberate division of labor within the administration. While Bessent and Grenel focused on diplomatic engagement with Maduro, Rubio's actions in Miami suggest preparation for a potential conflict, aligning with his warnings of Venezuelan threats during his March 2025 visit to Guyana. The strategic choice of Guyana from all possible countries reflects Rubio's prioritization of regional security and his readiness to position Guyana as a key partner potentially in a military or diplomatic capacity against Venezuela. This juaposition, Rubio's hardline approach in Miami versus the White House's pragmatism in Washington illustrates a calculated exclusion rather than mere coincidence aimed at advancing different policy agendas within the administration. Furthermore, the United States Guyana Security Cooperation facilitated through the United States Security Cooperation Office in Guyana enhances this strategic alignment. The USSCO representing the United States Southern Command provides military consultation and operational support to the Guyana Defense Force focusing on foreign military sales, security assistance and theater security cooperation engagement activities. This cooperation ongoing since at least 2019 underscores Guyana's role as a key security partner, particularly in the context of Venezuelan threats and alliance with Rubio's efforts to strengthen regional defenses against Madura's regime. The synchronization between Bessant and Grenel extends beyond Venezuela to include other Latin American regimes such as Cuba, which was likely part of the May 10th, 2025 White House briefings agenda. United States Cuba relations, historically tense since Fidel Castro's ascent in 1959, have seen a thaw under Trump's second term with pragmatic overtures aimed at securing migration agreements and countering Chinese influence in the region. On January 31st, 2025, Trump announced a humanitarian parole program for Cuban nationals alongside those from Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti to address illegal border crossings, reflecting a shift toward engagement rather than isolation. This policy overseen by Spessent Treasury Department through sanctions adjustments and Grenell's diplomatic efforts aligned with their approach to Venezuela. The May 10th briefing excluding Rubio likely discussed his intentions with Cuba to facilitate broader regional stability contrasting with Rubio's hardline stance against both Maduro and the Castro regime. This coordinated effort evident in the subsequent actions like the May 21st, 2025 sanction removals suggests a strategic realignment of United States policy toward Latin America prioritizing diplomatic outcomes over ideological conflicts. This synchronization between Bessant and Grenel is evident in the timing and nature of their actions. Following the May 10th briefing on May 21st, 2025, Bessent announced the removal of sanctions on two Venezuelans alongside targeting cartel Noreste members, suggesting a balanced approach to maintain diplomatic leverage while addressing narco threats. This occurred hours before Grenel's fake news claim at 8:53 p.m. Universal time denying a Miami Herald article's allegation of an oil for departes bill. The rapid response to control the narrative combined with Grenel's retweet of Bessant's exposed at 3:02 p.m. Universal time indicates a coordinated effort to manage public perception and avoid inflaming hardliners like Rubio. Their joint attendance at the May 10th briefing confirmed by secondary sources likely set the stage for these actions excluding excluding Rubio to advance a pragmatic policy. This synchronization reflects a strategic effort to balance United States interests with diplomatic outcomes contrasting with Rubio's stance and makes it a crucial theme. Donald Trump's statements on regime change and United States priorities, as quoted by Grenel, further illuminate the administration's shift toward pragmatism. On February 28th, 2025, at a rally in Cleveland, Ohio, Trump stated, "We are not going to waste time on regime change. We're going to focus on what's best for America, jobs, energy, and security. This statement occurring early in his term aligns with Granel's narrative of prioritizing United States interests over ideological goals like regime change in Venezuela. The context of the Ohio rally focusing on domestic issues and energy security underscores Trump's America first doctrine which Grenel echoed in his May 20th 2025 interview on Bannon's war room on April 1st 2025 at Mara Lago Trump warrant China is trying to take over Venezuela's oil We can't let that happen. It's not just about Venezuela. It's about protecting American jobs and energy security. As reported by Fox News, this statement made during a press conference with oil executives directly addresses Grenel's concern about preventing Chinese takeover, reflecting a pragmatic engagement with Maduro to secure United States economic interests. On May 10th, 2025, Trump tweeted on Truth Social. China wants Venezuela's oil badly. We're not going to let them have it. America first means securing our resources and jobs. This tweet coinciding with the White House briefing reinforces the priority of economic security over regime change. Aligning with Grenel's diplomacy, these statements, though not from Saudi Arabia, as Grenell suggested, provide ample context for his quotes, highlighting Trump's broader policy shift. Trump's approach to other authoritarian regimes such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, UAE, and Saudi Arabia can be extrapolated to Venezuela, reflecting a pragmatic engagement over ideological conflict. During his January 2025 meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Trump emphasized, "We are not here to change regimes. We are here to do business and protect American interests." As quoted by Reuters, this rhetoric focused on economic partnerships aligns with his approach to Maduro as seen in Reynolds negotiations in March 2025 during visits to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Trump stated in Abu Dhabi, "We are not in the business of regime change. We are in the business of making America strong through alliances and trade as quoted by Al Jazzer. This philosophy articulated in a July 2024 interview with Tucker Carlson. I want no enemies. Enemies are useful to grow and become stronger, but I would rather trade with them. underpins his engagement with Maduro. As quoted by Tucker Carlson Network, on May 5th, 2025, Trump tweeted, "We are not going to fight endless wars or chase regime change. We are going to make deals that benefit America." Venezuela, like any other country, can be a partner if they play by our rules. As quoted on truth social, this broader approach prioritizing trade and security over ideology aligns with Renault's efforts and contrasts with Rubio's stance, making it a crucial theme. The implications for Chevron's alterations in Venezuela are significant given the strategic exclusion and policy synchronization. On May 15th, 2025, Chevron CEO Mike Worth told Reuters, "We are working closely with the United States government to navigate the current license expiration on May 27th, 2025. Our priority is to protect our investments and maintain operational continuity. As quoted by Reuters, this indicates ongoing negotiations aligning with Grenel's May 20th, 2025 extension and contrasting with Rubio's expectation of expiration. No recent news on contract terminations, asset sales, or other verifiable transactions was found suggesting Chevron's joint ventures like Petro Boscan and Pro Independencia remain operational under general license framework for Chevron. The stability in Chevron's operations despite the internal policy divisions underscores the administration's pragmatic approach to securing United States energy interests in Venezuela. even as it navigates the tensions between Rubio's hardline stance and Bessant and Grenel's diplomatic engagement. The strategic exclusion of Rubio from the May 10th, 2025 White House briefing combined with the coordinated efforts of Besset and Grenel highlights a deliberate policy shift toward pragmatism prioritizing economic and security outcomes over ideological conflicts. This shift, evident in Trump's statements and the administration's actions, has profound implications for regional stability in the Caribbean, particularly in the context of Guyana's role and the United States Cuba relations, setting the stage for future policy developments. A spokeswoman for the state department stated that there is no confusion in foreign policy and that such foreign policy is directed by Marco Rubio. However, controversy still remains because OFAC licenses are provided by the Department of Treasury and the Secretary of Treasury is Scott Bessett who has been working a strategy on Venezuela with Donald Trump and Richard Grenell. Marco Rubio on purpose has decided not to meet with Nicolas Maduro and therefore is not well suited for United States policy in Venezuela. And that is the reason why Donald Trump has sent special envoys to countries such as Iran in the case of Whitkco or Venezuela and North Korea in the case of Richard Grenel because they are better negotiators with Maduro. And Trump likes to have two opposing factions working simultaneously to decide at the last minute which one will prevail. We should expect a statement from Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent at any time considering that lobing efforts from Chevron Corporation continue and we have four days left to settle the controversy on a possible Chevron's license renewal. And we have heard no word on any from Italy or Repzel from Spain which along with Chevron have been lobbing for renewal of their licenses. It sounds though that petroleum services companies such as Lumbberger or Basker Hues operations in Venezuela have officially been eliminated. And we will see during the next few weeks how Chinese, Iranian, and Russian companies will quickly take over. and Venezuelan population over time will align more with eastern hemisphere culture and economies as those are the ones that will provide us support to continue our economic transactions. Scott Bessant must clarify if he has the authority to issue or revoke OLAC licenses at his will as demonstrated by the removal of sanctions to two Venezuelans tied to Badura's regime or if Scott Bessant will continue sanctioning the Venezuelan petroleum industry. country knowing very well that China will take over and Scott Bessett's central job in his tenure is to counter China. Therefore, the spokeswoman for the State Department is wrong when she says that the State Department is solely responsible for foreign policy because the Treasury Department manages the economic implications of such foreign policy. And it seems that the Treasury Department and the State Department are working in confrontation and we are seeing constant changes of mind on a daily basis which is not welcomed by the international community which is slowly breaking apart from the United States which is seen as an unreliable partner which is no longer seen as an ally or which is even being considered as an enemy as happens in Venezuela because Venezuela welcomes 100 plus years of service of Chevron in our oil fields. But Marco Rubio just wants to destroy 100 years of shared history.