Navigating Post-Chevron Venezuela

Oil production continues beyond sanctions. OFAC general license 41B for Chevron's operations in Venezuela expired on May 27th 2025. Its expiration was anticipated to cut off the country's oil revenue, aligning with virtual terrorists goals. Tammy Bruce on May 27th 2025 called the expiration a happy ending license day, during a State Department briefing. Her statement suggested a complete end to Chevron's operations, framing it as a policy win for the Trump administration, in support for a regime change. However; Chevron received a new specific license for limited operations, this license allows chevron to maintain a $7 billion in assets but prohibits exploration, directly contradicting Bruce's narrative of a full cessation and revealing a policy inconsistency. The contradiction between the state department's messaging and the treasury's actions creates confusion. Bruce's statement implied a hardline stance, while the new license reflects a pragmatic approach, possibly to counter China's influence.

Chevron's CEO noted if the United States doesn't use Venezuela's oil, China will. This inconsistency impacts public opinion in Venezuela, where United States contradictions are noticed. Regime change factors are frustrated by mixed messaging, as they expected a tougher stance. Need for clarity is evident as unneeded controversy undermines United States credibility, despite its alleged confidentiality. Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC is requested to publish the new license to resolve this contradiction, reflecting the broader change of maintaining coherent United States foreign policy. Chevron had operated in Venezuela under OFAC licenses despite sanctions. Licenses such as general license 41B allowed limited operations, balancing economic interests with political pressure. Chevron's presence had provided revenue to PDVSA, complicating United States efforts to isolate the country. Abstensionists rely heavily on United States support to delegitimize the Venezuelan government, while boycotting elections. In contrast, participationists engaged securing 29 seats at the National Assembly. This division weakened their regime change expectations.

Venezuela countered the United states pressure by deepening ties with China, Iran and Russia, key allies in evading sanctions. China became Venezuela's largest oil buyer, while Russia provided military and economic support. These partnerships stabilized the Venezuelan government, reducing the effectiveness of United States sanctions and complicating abstensionist strategies. Regionally, president Nicolás Maduro found support from leaders like Colombia's president Gustavo Petro and Brazil's president Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, who oppose United States isolation efforts, further isolating abstensionists whose ability to rally international pressure against Venezuela remains limited. Venezuela's economic alliance with China, military alliance with Russia, along with opposition's participation in regional and National Assembly elections, highlights the ineffectiveness of exerting pressure through sanctions.

Domestically the opposition faces significant challenges: with public support below 20% according to most recent election results. Protests like the January 9th 2025 demonstrations saw low turnout, reflecting disillusionment. People no longer risk their lives for leaders perceived as detached, often in exile, highlighting the movement's struggle to maintain relevance. Edmundo González exit from Venezuela's opposition leadership in early 2025, due to illness, created a vacuum. His United States recognition as president in January 2025 had briefly unified abstensionists by June 2025. Venezuela is no longer a global headline, overshadowed by other crisis. From 2019 to 2023 its crisis dominated news. Now global focus has shifted, reducing the visibility of Venezuela's plight and the opposition's struggle.

Competing crises include Ukraine's war with Russia, Gaza's conflict, Iran's nuclear tensions, Taiwan's disputes, China tariffs and Pakistan's inability dominating headlines. These issues divert international attention from Venezuela's political and humanitarian development. Abstensionists' strategy of leveraging international support, to isolate the Venezuelan government, yields diminishing returns and weakens their position. Tammy Bruce's happy ending license day suggested a full end to Chevron's operations in Venezuela; however a new specific license allows minimal operations contradicting the state department's narrative. OFAC is able to maintain confidentiality under the freedom of information act 5 united states code 552 31 code of federal regulations 1.5, whose exemption specifically protects confidential, commercial information such as trade secrets, and commercial or financial information that is both confidential and obtained from a submitter. These laws protect sensitive information such as proprietary details in Chevron's license; however, public interest in resolving confusion outweighs confidentiality concerns.

Florida's diaspora is frustrated by the mixed messaging. They expected a hardline stance against Venezuela, but the new license signals pragmatism. Transparency could reassure this community. The new license might pave the way for United States Venezuela bilateral talks, further contradicting Tammy Bruce's hardline stance. This development underscores the ongoing tension between State and Treasury departments messaging. OFAC tends to maintain confidentiality under freedom of information act, suggesting a full license publication is unlikely without significant public pressure. The state department has not clarified the contradiction. Tammy bruce's silence on the new license perpetuates confusion. This lack of alignment continues to fuel controversy in Venezuela and South Florida, impacting United States credibility and necessitating further analysis of potential impact due to lack of transparency.

Publishing Chevron's new license could calm public opinion. Transparency would clarify whether Chevron's role is limited to asset maintenance, or petroleum transactions continue via joint ventures with PDVSA. Aligning State and Treasury messaging would restore United States credibility, undermined by Bruce's happy ending claim versus the new license. This clarity could also weaken the abstensionists overreliance on the license expiration narrative; however, OFAC faces challenges in disclosing the license given confidentiality protections, safeguarding proprietary information. Full disclosure might harm chevron or United States foreign policy interests. A limited statement confirming the license scope could balance transparency with security. Venezuela's oil transactions are already pivoting to China, Venezuela's largest oil buyer, as Chevron CEO Mike Wirth warned in Fox Business. This could offset the economic pressure intended, by limiting Chevron's operations, opting for a middle ground in order to issue a public statement without revealing proprietary details.

Growing media coverage may pressure OFAC to act. Transparency's benefits should outweigh the risks, potentially stabilizing united states policy perception in this crisis. The state department's hardline narrative, backed by Marco Rubio, aimed to reassure regime change narratives. Bilateral talks signal a softer approach, undermining the isolationist stance. The contradiction impacts United States policy consistency, confusing allies and adversaries alike. United States are perceived as unreliable, betraying the abstensionist position. Bilateral talks suggest engagement over confrontation, potentially accelerating Venezuela's leverage. Geopolitically, bilateral talks aim to counter China's role as Venezuela's largest oil buyer, while risking regime legitimization. Russia and Venezuela have been allies since the early 2000s under Hugo Chávez, a bond strengthened under Nicolás Maduro. Their partnership is rooted in shared anti United States sentiment, it spans oil coordination, military support and diplomatic backing, making them interchangeable in the context of United States foreign policy pressure. 

Both nations collaborate on oil through OPEC+ influencing global prices. Russia's Rosneft has invested heavily in Venezuela's PDVSA joint ventures, ensuring mutual economic support. Their interdependence means United States sanctions on one, like Venezuela's oil sector impact the other's ability to evade restrictions. Militarily, Russia supplies Venezuela with arms and advisors: the support bolsters the Venezuelan government against internal dissent and United States pressure, while Venezuela provides russia a Latin American foothold, countering United States influence in the western hemisphere, a strategic concern for United States policy makers. Diplomatically Russia recognizes Nicolás Maduro 2024 contested election victory. This support counters United States efforts to delegitimize Maduro, such as recognizing Edmundo González in January 2025.

Russia's United Nations veto power further shields Venezuela from international sanctions, reinforcing their alliance. Venezuela reciprocates by supporting Russia's actions in Ukraine, abstaining from United Nations votes that condemn Russia. This mutual diplomatic backing strengthens the resistance to United States pressure, highlighting the challenge of isolating either government without addressing their combined geopolitical strategy. The interchangeability of Russia and Venezuela means United States pressure on one affects the other. Sanctions on Russia's energy sector impacts the Venezuelan investments targets and pushes Venezuelan government closer to Russia and China. A maximum pressure campaign on Russia and Venezuela starts with economic sanctions, targeting their energy sectors: for russia it means banning all oil exports to the United States and allies. Revoking Chevron's license cuts venezuela's oil income. 

China's role as Venezuela's largest buyer may offset this pressure. China's economic rule maintains both Venezuela and Russia. Oil market reports estimate Venezuela's crude production at 900,000 barrels per day in March rising to approximately 1 million barrels per day in May. A detailed export breakdown follows: the United States imported 149,000 barrels per the week of may 23rd 2025 per united states energy information administration data, down from 250,000 barrels per day in January, totaling 4,470,000 barrels for May as a result of 149,000 barrels per day multiplied by 30 days, adjusted for post may 27th cessation. This $52 million weekly revenue was critical before Chevron's exit, after which imports likely ceased. China imported 428,000 barrels per day in April 2025, increasing to 450,000 barrels per day in May, following Delcy rodriguez May 1st visit to secure more purchases. This totals 13,500 barrels, underscoring China's key role in Venezuela's sanctions driven market reorientation.

India received 64,200 barrels per day in april 2025, growing to 70,000 barrels per day in may due to rising demand totaling 2,100,000 barrels europe saw 100,000 barrels per day via blend 22 exports totaling 3 million barrels malaysia took 50,000 barrels per day totaling 1,550,000 barrels with a 920,000 barrel boscan cargo trans shipped while other markets received 158,200 barrels per day totaling 4,94,200 barrels. Cuba, a historical ally, received 30,000 barrels per day in May 2025, down from 56,000 barrels per day. In 2023, due to Venezuela's refinery outages, Cuba's monthly export volume totals 930,000 barrels, reflecting strained energy support amid domestic shortages, impacting PDVSA's commitments to allies despite higher overall exports. Yet venezuela's overall exports reached 1 million seven thousand two hundred barrels per day. 

Iran supplied 35 million barrels of condensate since 2021, aiding heavy crude exports concurrently. Nafta imports rose to 94,000 barrels per day in April 2005, oil prices dropped 23% since December 2024 with Venezuelan crude sold $35 per barrel below Brent benchmarks, exacerbating economic strain. While exports increased PDVSA faces rising shipping costs, with fright rises up 15% in 2025 due to sanctions related risks. This increases operational costs by $5 per barrel, reducing margins and forcing PDVSA to prioritize high value markets like China and India to sustain revenue. This export shift highlights PDVSA's reliance on intermediaries to evade sanctions, successfully targeting Asian and European markets. production has risen in may to over onemillion barrels per day due to a successful pivot to China. Declining prices, logistical challenges and rising costs threaten financial stability, pushing Venezuela to deepen ties with nonwestern partners. Sanctions limit access to advanced drilling technologies.

Chevron entered venezuela in 1923 through its legacy company, Venezuelan Gulf Oil company, establishing a century long presence. In the 1990s it formed joint ventures with PDVSA, including Petroboscán in Zulia, Petroindependente in Zulia, Petropiar in Anzoátegui, Petroindependencia in Monagas, and Loran in Delta Amacuro. These partnerships allowed Chevron to tap into Venezuela's vast oil reserves. Chevron contributed to 25% of Venezuela's oil output, producing around 200,000 barrels per day at its peak. Its technical expertise was crucial in maintaining aging infrastructure, especially in the Orinoco Belt's extra heavy oil fields. Chevron's investments in upgraders ensured the crude was marketable, despite Venezuela's economic and political instability. United States sanctions in 2019 were designed to promote change and restricted Chevron's operations, targeting PDVSA.

A license issued in 2020 allowed limited activities, and it was later expanded in 2022 under Biden as a general license 41 to permit exports to the United States. Chevron exported 290,000 barrels per day before trump revoked General License 41, and substituted it with General License 41A, General License 41B, and the current confidential specific license. Economically Chevron supported local communities, particularly in Zulia, through jobs and higher salaries than PDVSA. Petroboscán employed thousands with bonuses fostering commerce in oil towns. Local suppliers benefited, creating a ripple effect that stabilized communities amidst venezuela's broader economic crisis, making Chevron's role significant beyond production. Trump's revocation of Chevron's general license 41A in march 2025 forced a wind down by May 27th through general license 41B halting production, and shifting Chevron to maintenance and PDVSA joint venture emphasis, with a new specific, confidential license. This decision reflected United States efforts to isolate Venezuela, but reducing Western influence in the country's oil sector, impacting both the industry and local economies.

Chevron's exit marks a turning point, opening opportunities for China, Russia and Iran to expand their influence. PDVSA assumed control of Chevron's joint ventures, after general license 41B expired on May 27th 2025. As the majority stakeholder, PDVSA now oversees production, worker management and export sales. The shift marks a return to state dominance in Venezuela's oil sector. PDVSA plans to redirect some crude to domestic refineries to address fuel shortages. It modified an upgrader to produce feedbacks like vacuum gas oil, a strategy used during past sanctions in 2020. PDVSA shifted export focus to non United States markets, with China importing 428,000 barrels per day and India 64,200 barrels per day. In april 2025 PDVSA introduced blend 22, a new crude grade targeting Europe and Asia. A 920,000 barrel Boscán cargo was shipped to Malaysia, a trans shipping hub for China evading United States sanctions. Dependency on the US for heavy crude exports increased nafta's imports to 94,000 barrels per day in april 2025: Iran has supplied 35 million barrels of condensate since 2021, but sanctions complicate this supply chain.

PDVSA's reliance on external inputs highlights vulnerabilities in its export strategy under United States sanctions: infrastructure maintenance is a significant challenge for PDVSA, lacking chevron's technical expertise and financial resources. Aging oil fields require substantial investment which PDVSA strives to secure despite United States sanctions. Security concerns persist as sixty attacks on oil facilities have been thwarted in 2025. Chevron's exit threatens Zulia's poorest communities as reduced economic activity could exacerbate poverty, Job losses and lower wages under PDVSA are expected as the state company may cut bonuses previously offered by Chevron, directly impacting household incomes and local economies. Local suppliers and businesses face financial strain as commerce declines in oil dependent towns. The loss of Chevron's contracts has disrupted supply chains, leaving small businesses struggling to survive. The economic downturn threatens Zulia's social fabric, with families facing increased hardship amid Venezuela's broader crisis. The ripple effects extend to education and health care, as reduced incomes limit community resources. Schools and clinics already underfunded may see further decline, worsening living conditions. This socioeconomic fallout deepens Venezuela's humanitarian crisis, with Zulia's vulnerable populations bearing the brunt of Chevron's departure and PDVSA's take over.

Abstensionists and virtual terrorists are blamed for undermining efforts to address economic woes, leaving communities without effective advocacy or solutions to their plight. The socioeconomic fallout in Zulia highlights the human cost of geopolitical decisions. The potential for protests or increased migration looms as residents grapple with economic hardship, underscoring the urgent need for policies that address the needs of oil dependent communities. In Venezuela reduced oil revenues exacerbate Venezuela's economic crisis, limiting funds for imports of food medicine and other essentials. This deepens the humanitarian crisis, with inflation soaring and poverty rates rising, threatening social stability. Communities struggle to access basic goods and services. 

Maurel & Prom, a French oil company holds a 40% stake in Venezuela's Urdaneta field, producing 6,500 barrels per day in 2022. Its license was revoked in March 2025 with a winddown period until may 31st 2025, impacting its operations. United states sanctions led to a 15% drop in Maurel & Prom's share price, reflecting market concerns about its future in Venezuela. The company faces penalties for non-compliance, forcing it to navigate a complex regulatory environment while engaging with United States authorities for potential new authorizations. Limited operations continued with Maurel & Prom receiving blend 22 cargos in april 2025 for debt repayment. This debt repayment mechanism allows the firm to maintain a minimal presence, but sanctions restrict its ability to expand or invest in Venezuela's oil sector. European firms like Repsol & ENI contribute 10% of Venezuela's oil production: they provide technical expertise, yet their activities are curtailed by United States secondary sanctions, limiting their operational scope.

Chevron's exit signals a hostile environment for Western companies, deterring future investment in Venezuela's oil industry. The departure of major players like Chevron reduces competition, potentially leaving smaller firms like Maurel and Prom to either adapt or exit, further isolating Venezuela's oil sector. Maurel & Prom's uncertain future underscores Venezuela's reliance on state control and nonwestern partners, like China, as Western firms retreat, highlighting the broader challenges of operating in a sanctioned environment. PDVSA now controls export procedures from Chevron's joint ventures, focusing on non United States markets to evade sanctions. This includes managing production, transportation and sales of crude grades like Boscan and Blend 22, introducing new challenges in maintaining efficiency.

Trans shipping hubs like Malaysia ensure export continuity, but rely on intermediaries. Logistical challenges include securing tankers and navigating international waters under sanctions. Tanker fleets operated by China and Iran helped PDVSA bypass restrictions. Payment uncertainties lead to discounted sales and barter deals with Venezuelan crude sold significantly below Brent benchmark. Revenue is reduced as buyers exploit Venezuela's sanctions induced vulnerabilities, United States secondary tariffs include a 25% surcharge on Venezuelan oil buyers. PDVSA yearns to thrive on sustaining exports under a sanctioned environment.