Investable Venezuelan oil fields

Potential in Venezuelan oil amounts to $100 billion. Junín block 2 within the Orinoco Belt is located in Las Mercedes municipality, Guárico state near Zuata. It is adjacent to the easternmost Boyacá field. Junín 2 contains extra heavy crude API 8 to 10, requiring advanced upgrading. Petrovietnam began operations in 2008 under Petrojunín, focusing on drilling and pipeline planning. Junín field holds 10.5 billion barrels of proven reserves, 100 billion post Magna Reserva certification. Upgrading via delayed coking and hydrotreating produces exportable synthetic crude, making it a strategic asset. Vietnam's 2008 joint venture with PDVSA is 60% PDVSA and 40% Petrovietnam, targeting Junín Block 2 historically called Zuata.

By 2012, over 30 wells were drilled, but production reached only 5,000 barrels per day, due to underestimation of horizontal drilling, delayed coking, and steam injection requirements, corresponded by limited water access. Logistical challenges included transporting equipment 220 kilometers from Puerto La Cruz, hindered by the block's remoteness in Guárico. Zuata's small population of 5,000 offered minimal support, unlike Dación's urban proximity. Financial challenges included Venezuela's economic decline between 2008 and 2015, and global oil price volatility: restricting Petro Vietnam's $5 billion investment, and limiting infrastructure development. Operations ceased in 2015 due to nationalization under Maduro's consolidation strategy, significantly later than other exits. For example, Repsol's Petrozuata exited in 2012.

Planned pipelines to the José Antonio prochemical complex remained at the initial stage. Junín Block 2 currently produces 10,000 barrels per day at 30% capacity. A renewed Vietnam joint venture aligned with 2019 to 2029 plans,it targets 120,000 barrels per day by 2029: using $3 billion from Asian investors to drill over 200 wells, in 24 to 36 months. Investors are needed to construct 150,000 barrel per day upgrading facilities, for delayed coking and hydrotreating. Steam injection and polymer flooding must be implemented. Logistics infrastructure must be developed, including roads and housing to support Zuata's limited services. This aligns with Venezuela's goal to add 2 million barrels per day via Orinoco Belt projects. Junín Block 2 strengthens Venezuela's ties with Asian markets and Petro Vietnam's global presence. Its development supports energy security, reduces reliance on sanctioned regions and aligns with open market strategies.

PDVSA and CNPC Boyacá block 3. Boyacá 3 is part of the Orinoco belt and is developed through a joint venture led by PDVSA 60% stake, with CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation 40% stake. Boyacá 3 targets extra heavy crude, leveraging CNPC's expertise in heavy oil extraction, despite sanctions: aligning with Venezuela's absolute productive independence plan. Boyacá 3 strategic location in Guárico supports China's energy security goals, enhancing Venezuela's OPEC leverage. CNPC's technical and financial support despite sanctions, is crucial for extracting extra heavy crude. Current production is limited, but the project aims for 125,000 barrels per day by 2029.

CNPC has been a major player since the early 2000s with interests in the Orinoco Belt, including the Boyacá Block 3. Production was scaled back due to sanctions and debt issues. This deal reactivates these efforts, leveraging CNPC's experience in heavy oil projects. The infrastructure timeline of 36 to 48 months for building upgrading facilities and extensively drilling reflects the scale of investment. Infrastructure development, including upgraders is critical to achieving projected output. The expected 125,000 barrels per day increase within four years, contributes significantly to Venezuela's production goals. This boost enhances OPEC leverage, potentially demanding a higher quota. This strategic importance lies in restoring production and influencing global energy markets.

PDVSA and Roseft Junín Block 6: Junín block 6 is located at Independencia municipality of Anzoátegui State. Junín 6 is developed by PDVSA with Rosneft. The project focuses on extra heavy crude, leveraging Rosneft experience in challenging environments. Production stalled since the late 2000s, due to sanctions and is targeted to reach 180,000 barrels per day by 2029. Junín 6 strategic role supports Russia's energy export goals, replacing Western majors and aligning with Venezuela's independence strategy. Upgrade development and logistics improvements are key to success. Rosneft entered Venezuela in the mid 2000s with interests in the Junin block 6. Operations were suspended due to sanctions, but resumed with limited activity. This deal reactivates these efforts, leveraging Rosneft experience in heavy oil projects. Junín 6 infrastructure timeline of 24 to 36 months for constructing, drilling, and processing facilities reflects the need for Russian equipment. The expected 180,000 barrel per day increase within four years contributes significantly to Venezuela's production goals.

PDVSA and Indian Oil corporation MP3 block: The MP3 block is part of the Mariscal Sucre project in the Gulf of Paria, a joint venture between PDVSA and Indian Oil Corporation of India, targeting light crude and gas. The block leverages Indian oil's offshore expertise to achieve 100,000 barrels per day by 2028. The 18 to 24 month timeline for platform and pipelines reflects offshore challenges, with oversight from the situational monitoring and supervision room. The blocks's proximity to Trinidad and Tobago enhances regional cooperation, supporting Venezuela's light crude export goals. The projected 100,000 barrels per day increase by 2028 significantly boosts Venezuela's production goals, enhancing OPEC leverage and potentially securing a higher quota.

PDVSA and ONGC Videsh: Platform Deltana is located offshore and is developed by PDVSA with ONGC Videsh of India, targeted for development through a new joint venture focusing on natural gas and light crude. The block aims for 80,000 barrels per day of oil equivalent by 2029. Minimum current production reflects sanctions and underinvestment, but OMGC Videsh's offshore capabilities support ambitious targets. The block's strategic location near Caribbean markets enhances export potential, aligning with Venezuela's gas diversification goals. OMGC Videsh entered Venezuela in the early 2000s with interests in the Platforma Deltana. Gas production was a focus, but sanctions halted progress. This deal reactivates these efforts, leveraging OMGC Videsh experience in offshore projects. The infrastructure timeline is 30 to 36 months for constructing offshore infrastructure, including gas processing facilities.

PDVSA and Maurel & Prom MBU-5 block: MBU-5 block is operated by Maurel & Prom, in partnership with PDVSA. It is located in Monagas state, known for light crude fields of API 35 thru 40. Maurel & Prom is a French company with a history in Venezuela since 2018. Maurel & Prom's operations in Monagas reveal general activities such as gas flaring projects. Current production stands at 2,000 barrels per day, with historical peeps assumed at 5,000 barrels per day. Projected output is 20,000 barrels per day by 2027. MBU-5 block's importance lies in enhancing Venezuela's exploratory capabilities, attracting diverse investors and aligning with smaller operator strategies, aiming to boost production despite challenges.

PDVSA and domestic consortium operate Santa Bárbara field, targeted for development through a new joint venture or existing operations. The consortium includes Reimpet International Corporation. Reimpet's technical expertise is crucial for rehabilitating wells. The deal aims for 150,000 barrels per day within 3 years, fully achievable. Santa Barbara features medium to heavy crude API gravity 15 to 25, while its proximity to existing infrastructure supports rapid scaling. Reimpet has focused on well rehabilitation since the 2000s particularly in Anzoátegui. Delta Drilling has been a Venezuelan company since 1980. Delta Drilling provides drilling services. Its inclusion in the consortium supports operational continuity. Venuel was founded in 1995. Venuel offers engineering and consulting services. Its expertise is vital for infrastructure upgrades. Previous efforts were limited by underinvestment.

Santa Bárbara deal reactivates these efforts, leveraging local expertise in maintaining infrastructure. The Anzoátegui region's potential for reactivating idle wells makes these fields a strategic asset. The infrastructure timeline of 12 to 18 months for upgrading existing infrastructure, reflects the use of local resources. The expected 150,000 barrel per day increase within three years, contributes significantly to Venezuela's production goals. This boost enhances OPEC leverage, potentially demanding a higher quota.

La Rosa field is situated at the La Rosa Parish of the Cabimas municipality in Zulia State, on the eastern shore of Lake Maracaibo, approximately 5 kilometers from Cabimas city. La Rosa is part of Zulia's Bolívar coastal field complex, operated by PDVSA, targeting conventional oil of API 20 to 30. La Rosa was discovered in 1917 by Royal Dutch Shell. La Rosa field peaked at 300,000 barrels per day in 1950, making it one of Venezuela's earliest and most productive. The infrastructure includes over 500 wells, a central processing facility capable of handling 400,000 barrels per day, and gas processing plants with water injection systems for enhanced oil recovery. Historical methods like gas lift and thermal recovery were employed, but production declined to 15,000 barrels per day by 2023 due to underinvestment and sanctions from 2019.

La Rosa infrastructure operates at 20% capacity. Recovery potential is high: estimated at 100 million barrels, primarily from secondary and tertiary recovery methods like steam injection and polymer flooding. With rehabilitation of existing enhanced oil recovery systems and modern drilling techniques, La Rosa could achieve 50,000 barrels per day by 2031: through secondary recovery techniques, aligning with recent recovery efforts in nearby fields like La Salina. Its proximity to Lake Maracaibo supports logistics.

El Furrial field is situated in the El Furrial parish of Maturín municipality of Monagas state, a key oil producing region in eastern Venezuela. This municipality is known for its significant oil reserves and historical production peaks. Discovered in 1986, El Furrial peaked at 800,000 barrels per day in 1997, but production declined to 50,000 barrels per day by 2023 due to underinvestment and sanctions. The infrastructure includes over 2,000 wells and a central processing facility: capable of handling 1 million barrels per day with gas processing plants and water injection systems for enhanced oil recovery. El Furrial also features tertiary recovery methods like steam and polymer flooding, critical for maintaining production from nature reservoirs. El Furrial field's infrastructure deteriorated since the early 2000s, due to lack of maintenance and sanctions, with only 25% of wells operational by 2023.

El Furrial field remains under PDVSA's control, with no foreign joint ventures permitted. Recovery could involve: rehabilitating existing enhanced oil recovery infrastructure, and modern drilling techniques. El Furrial's extensive well network and processing facility offer recovery potential, reaching 300,000 barrels per day by 2030 through enhanced oil recovery, despite sanctions-driven decline. Its existing infrastructure supports rapid scaling, making it critical for Venezuela's OPEC influence and global market presence.

La Sabana field is situated in the Guanta city of Anzoátegui State near the Caribbean coast. Initial petroleum activity in Guanta began in 1917, with exploratory drilling by Royal Dutch Shell, marking the early 20th century's oil exploration in the region. Discovered in 1928, La Sabana peaked at 200,000 barrels per day in 1980, but was abandoned in 2015 due to economic unviability: amidst falling oil prices and lack of investment. The infrastructure includes 500 wells, and a processing plant capable of handling 250,000 barrels per day: with gas processing facilities and water injection systems for enhanced oil recovery. La Sabana field also featured secondary recovery methods like gas lift, but these have been inactive since abandonment.

La Sabana remains under PDVSA's control, with no production and significant infrastructure decay, with only 10% of wells potentially recoverable. Recovery could involve modern drilling technologies and enhanced oil recovery methods, targeting 100,000 barrels per day by 2032, leveraging existing processing capabilities and coastal access for export, enhancing Venezuela's production diversity and market influence. Existing infrastructure supports recovery, diversifying production and market influence.

Venezuela's oil production stands at approximately 1 million barrels per day. This figure reflects a recovery from the lows of 500,000 barrels per day in early 2024, driven by limited sanctions, relief, and domestic efforts under the absolute productive independence plan. The nine new deals signed on June 7th, 2025 inspire rehabilitation of dozens of energy projects nationwide, aiming to significantly boost current output by leveraging international and domestic expertise and investment. Each contract lasts 20 years, with PDVSA holding at least 50% of crude output, usually 60%. The total investment is in excess of $20 billion, financed through crude shipments and includes tax exemptions for partners. This strategy seeks to sustain foreign currency inflows amidst sanctions, authorized by National Assembly's anti-blockade law.

Further contracts are planned by Venezuela, reflecting a push for sovereignty, but United States sanctions complicate global trade with ongoing debates on their effectiveness. The Orinoco belt has 27 blocks: Boyacá has six blocks, Junín has eleven blocks, Ayacucho has six blocks. and Carabobo has four blocks. We have only covered seven of those blocks. Including all 27 blocks could double our fuel count, highlighting a massive economic opportunity for investors: with potential investments exceeding $100 billion, and annual revenues around $100 billion as well.

Specific evasion tactics include forgery of shipping bills. Venezuelan entities, such as PDVSA and its joint ventures, have employed sanctions evasion tactics: by falsifying shipping bills. For example, a Reuters report details how PDVSA has used falsified invoices to conceal final oil destinations: diverging shipments to non-sanctioned countries such as Turkey and Malaysia. This involves altering documents, to show legitimate destinations while oil is transferred offshore through ship to ship transfers. These tactics have allowed revenue streams to be maintained, despite United States sanctions. The practice of ship to ship transfers is supported by a crucial transfer center offshore. PDVSA has facilitated these transfers, increasing costs but reducing oversight.

A study from 2020 estimates that more than 70% of Venezuelan exports have been carried out through ship to ship transfers, avoiding direct sanctions. This requires complex logistical coordination, including tankers and has been effective despite maritime challenges. These tactics, although illegal under sanctions, highlight the sector's resilience. However, they require transparency and technology to mitigate corruption risks. Blockchain could track shipments, ensuring legality.

Evasion tactics for oil exports logistics also involve bills of lading. Venezuela's oil exports of 1,007,200 barrels per day in May 2025 face United States sanctions, targeting PDVSA and related entities, aiming to limit the country's revenue. To circumvent these, Venezuela employs complex logistics often involving petroleum cargo ships and manipulated documentation. Another tactic involves third party, non-sanctioned countries for reexport: masking origin. For example, Malaysia and China re-export Venezuelan oil, with China buying 450,000 barrels in May 2025. Tactic is to amend altered shipping documents.

Bills of lading are falsified to show different ports or exporters. Bills of lading might claim oil loaded in Trinidad and Tobago instead of Venezuela. Shell companies are used to obscure ownership and origin, registered in other jurisdictions. Examples include entities like Elemento Ltd and Swiss Oil Trading, sanctioned in 2021, which facilitated sales. Disabling transponders involves turning off equipment to avoid detection, though it increases risk. Ships carrying Venezuelan oil disabled transponders rooted to United States, per Treasury reports. Corruption bribes also facilitate movement without proper documentation.

Logistics of a petroleum cargo ship journey is as follows: A ship loads oil at a Venezuelan port such as Puerto La Cruz, under a falsified bill of lading, claiming origin from Trinidad and Tobago. This document issued by PDVSA or a shell company lists a nonsanctioned exporter and ports. The ship sails to Malaysia, unloading at a port like Port Clang. Here the oil is reloaded onto another vessel, with a new bill of lading now showing Malaysian origin facilitated by intermediaries. Alternatively, at sea, the ship meets another vessel for a ship to ship transfer, transferring oil without entering a port, complicating tracking. This is often done in international waters with transponders disabled to avoid detection. The final destination such as China receives the oil with documentation showing it as Malaysian or another non-sanctioned origin, ensuring payment in non United States currencies.

Bills of lading are typically produced by the shipper; for example PDVSA, and carrier detailing cargo origin, destination and parties in evasion. PDVSA or shell companies issue falsified versions, altering fields like port of loading changed to a non-sanctioned port, for example Trinidad and Tobago instead of Venezuela. Exporter name is listed as a shell company, for example Swiss Oil trading to obscure PDVSA's involvement. Cargo description is sometimes mislabeled to hide its Venezuelan characteristics, though heavy crude properties can be hard to disguise. These documents are often backed by corrupt practices, with bribes ensuring ports authorities or shipping agents accept them.

The 2021 United States Treasury action against networks like Slagger Business Group highlights such practices, including falsified bills to broker sales. Case studies and recent developments include 2020 reports, indicating Venezuelan oil was transferred to Chinese tankers of Malaysia, with bills of lading altered to show Malaysian origin, enabling sales to China at discounted prices. In 2021, the United States sanctioned entities like Elemento Ltd for facilitating oil sales, noting their use of falsified documents and ship to ship transfers, highlighting the international network involved. Impact on OPEC leverage is assessed as Venezuela's increased production would amount to 2,000,000 barrels per day or beyond. That would significantly enhance its leverage within OPEC. Currently, Venezuela's quota is around 800,000 barrels per day. Restoring production to two million barrels per day would reassert influence. Venezuela could demand a higher quota, potentially up to 1.5 million barrels per day, aligning with its historical role as a founding member of OPEC.

Increased supply could moderate global oil prices, benefiting OPEC's collective strategy, especially amidst tensions with known OPEC+ producers, considering the United States geopolitical weight. Higher production would strengthen Venezuela's position in negotiations with other OPEC+ members, potentially Saudi Arabia and Russia, enhancing its bargaining power. The resurgence could also influence OPEC+ dynamics, as Venezuela's output would counterbalance production cuts by other members, potentially leading to a re-evaluation of quotas and market shares.

Below is a detailed breakdown of the natural resources for each of the five sanctioned countries, emphasizing oil and gas due to their reference to energy reserves. Venezuela has 303.3 billion barrels of oil reserves and 19.6 6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Other significant minerals in Venezuela are gold, iron, ore, bite, and diamonds.

Iran features oil reserves of 157.2 billion barrels of oil and its natural gas reserves are 32.3 trillion cubic meters. Other significant minerals for Iran are coal, chromium, copper, iron, ore, lead, manganese, zinc, and sulfur.

Russia features 107.8 billion barrels of oil reserves and its natural gas reserves are 37.4 trillion cubic meters. Other significant minerals for Russia are coal, iron, ore, nickel, copper, platinum, aluminum, lead, and zinc.

Iraq has 145.00 billion barrels of oil reserves while its natural gas reserves are 3.5 trillion cubic meters. Other significant minerals for Iraq are phosphates and sulfur.

Libya has 48.4 billion barrels of oil reserves featuring 1.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Other significant minerals for Libya are gypsum, gypsum, salt, and marble.

Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves globally at 303.3 billion barrels with significant natural gas reserves. Let's elaborate on the sanctions imposed by the United States on each of these countries, focusing on those most relevant to the context of energy reserves: the United States has imposed extensive sanctions on Venezuela since 2019, targeting the government of President Nicolas Maduro. PDVSA, the state-owned oil company and key individuals. These sanctions include blocking property and interests in property of designated persons, prohibiting transactions with certain entities, and restricting the import of Venezuelan oil imports on energy sector. 

These sanctions have significantly reduced oil exports from over 2 million barrels per day in 2019 to around 700,000 barrels per day in April 2025. As reported, they aim to limit revenue to the Venezuelan government, affected by the PDVSA's ability to maintain infrastructure and attract investment. Legal basis executive orders 13,850 and 13,884, among others form the basis of these sanctions with the office of foreign assets control OFAC overseeing implementation.

Iran sanctions overview: United States sanctions on Iran have been in place since the 1979 hostage crisis, with intensification under the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaigns. This includes secondary sanctions on entities doing business with Iran, targeting its oil banking and shipping sectors. Iran's oil exports have fluctuated, dropping to merely zero in 2019, but partially recovering to around 1.5 million barrels per day by 2023 due to exemptions and evasion tactics. These sanctions aim to curb Iran's nuclear program and regional influence. The Iran sanctions act, executive order 13,599 and subsequent measures under the joint comprehensive plan of action.

Russia sanctions overview: Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States has imposed multifaceted sanctions on Russia, including energy sector restrictions, financial sanctions, and export controls. Sanctions target Russian energy companies like Gazprom and Rosneft, limiting their access to western technology and markets. However, Russia has mitigated some impacts by redirecting exports to China and India. Legal basis is executive orders 13,660 and 13,664, along with the countering of America's adversaries.

Syria sanctions overview: the United States has sanctioned Syria since 1979 with significant escalation after the 2011 civil war. These include the sailor Syria civilian protection act targeting the Assad regime and its supporters. Syria's oil production has plummeted due to conflict and sanctions with limited exports. The sanctions aim to isolate the regime economically. Legal basis executive order 13,572 and the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

North Korea sanctions overview: the United States has imposed strict sanctions on North Korea due to its nuclear program and human rights abuses, including bans on most trade and financial information. North Korea's energy sector is minimal with limited oil reserves and production. Sanctions severely restrict any potential energy trade legal basis, executive order 13,722 and the North Korea sanctions and policy enhancements.