Cowardly diplomacy vs. Burkina Faso

Recent reports suggest a new limited OFAC license for Chevron's operations in Venezuela would allow minimal maintenance, balancing engagement and isolation. We will explore how this compromise impacts Richard Grenell and Marco Rubio, while addressing Magalli Meda's legal situation, including her recent diplomatic criticisms and potential nationality revocation risks. A limited OFAC license for Chevron, allowing basic operations but restricting full production, seems to lean toward a partial victory for Grenell, Trump's envoy who favors engagement to maintain United States influence. It kept Chevron in Venezuela giving Grenell some leverage for negotiations. like detainees releases but with reduced economic impact, limiting his ability to secure big wins. Success estimate is about 60% success for Grenell, as it aligns with his strategy but falls short of a full renewal for Rubio for whom it's more of a setback around 40% success, as it contradicts his goal of isolating Maduro, though he can frame the restrictions as limiting Maduro's gains. This compromise reflects Trump's balanced approach, but it's not a clear win lose. Both will need to adapt with Grenell likely pushing for more incentives, and Rubio managing base criticism.

Magalli Meda is a Venezuelan opposition activist who recently criticized diplomats in Caracas for being cowardly, and not confronting Maduro's regime, urging them to prioritize human rights. Her reasoning seems rooted in frustration with perceived inaction during Venezuela's crisis, expecting diplomats to act boldly to save lives like releasing detainees; however, this language isn't diplomatically acceptable: it oversimplifies diplomats constraints and risks alienating them, potentially complicating their missions. Moderate opposition figures and diplomats likely feel unfurly targeted as Meda's rhetoric align with radical views, possibly echoing Maria Corina Machado's past complaints about protest security, now seen as ineffective. Venezuela's National Assembly, controlled by the Socialist Party, has discussed revoking citizenship for opposition figures accused of betraying the homeland by supporting foreign sanctions, targeting leaders like Machado, though no laws passed due to constitutional protections from article 35.

While May regional and governor elections maintained socialist majority in national assembly and state governorships, upcoming constitutional reforms could enable such measures. Criticizing diplomats and calling Chevron a criminal organization fits this category, especially given her United States presence, but actual revocation remains uncertain without legal changes. The United States Venezuela policy debate revolves around Chevron's OFAC license expired on May 27th 20125, amidst a broader geopolitical struggle involving economic sanctions, migration and countering adversarial influence from China, Russia and Iran. Tension remains between United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell over whether to renew Chevron's license, which allows the company to operate in Venezuela despite United States sanctions. Rubio advocates for maximum pressure approach to isolate Maduro, while Grenell favors engagement to maintain United States influence and secure concessions like detainee releases.

Grenell announced a license extension on May 22nd, claiming it was approved by Trump and tied to an agreement with Caracas that secured the release of Joe Sinclair, an American detainee transported to Antigua and Barbuda. Grenell argued that Chevron's presence counters China's influence in Venezuela's oil sector; however, Rubio announced on May 23rd 2025 that the Chevron license would expire as scheduled on May 27th, aligning with his hardline policy to economically isolate Maduro. This decision followed Trump's initial revocation in February 2025, requiring Chevron to wind down operations by the deadline. A negotiation involves El Salvador's President Nayib Bukele, who offered to deport 252 Venezuelans detained in El Salvador, after United States deportations in exchange for nine Americans and some opposition figures.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro suggested a broader exchange: Venezuela would release the nine Americans and a limited number of opposition figures, but only if El Salvador also releases all 252 Venezuelans and provides guarantees for their safe return to Venezuela, without facing further detention or persecution. Additionally the United States would lift certain sanctions on Venezuelan officials as part of the deal, as humanitarian gesture to restore diplomatic goodwill. Maduro's counter proposal reflects his strategy of leveraging detainee exchanges to extract maximum concessions, a pattern consistent with prior negotiations such as accepting deportees in exchange for the Chinese: releases the demand for sanctions relief, aligns with his broader narrative of resisting United States economic war. It aims to alleviate pressure on his government while addressing domestic criticism over detained Venezuelans abroad. Trump's indecision tolerates competing views between Rubio and Grenell.

Rubio's announcement came after Cuban American lawmakers and GOP legislators pressured Trump, arguing that a Chevron extension would undermine his broader legislative agenda. Rubio leveraged a White House event with a University of Florida gathering, to directly influence Trump. Separate negotiations between both Grenell and moderate State Department officials, with Jorge Rodríguez Venezuela's interlocutor, were suspended after Trump's license decision, indicating Maduro's reluctance to cooperate without concessions. The Venezuelan Ministry of Interior and Justice has escalated repression, with 70 percent signaling defiance amid United States policy debates.

Prior analysis evaluated two binary scenarios: a full license renewal favoring Grenell, or expiration favoring Rubio. A third scenario emerges, featuring a limited license for minimal maintenance of Chevron's operations in Venezuela. A full renewal would allow Chevron to continue producing 200,000 barrels per day, contributing between $2.3 and $3.2 billion annually to Venezuela's economy. This would align with Grenell's strategy providing leverage for negotiations like El Salvador deal or further detainee releases such as six Americans still detained. It would however contradict Rubio's goal of isolating Maduro, likely causing political backlash from his Florida political base. Expiration would force Chevron to cease operations, cutting off economic benefits to Venezuelan government. This aligns with Rubio's maximum pressure approach, supported by Magalli Meda, who labels Chevron a criminal organization; however, it would strip Grenell of a key bargaining chip, likely halting Venezuelan support for deportations at an 80% to 90% probability, exacerbating the United States migration crisis, and allowing China to dominate Venezuela's oil sector. 

Compromise would allow Chevron to maintain basic infrastructure, but restricting full scale production or revenue generation. This provides Grenell with some leverage to continue engagement, though significantly less than a full renewal, while partially aligning with Rubio's goal of limiting Maduro's economic relief. It reduces short term escalation by offering Maduro minimal economic support, but risks perpetuating the status quo: neither pressuring Maduro enough to force change, nor providing sufficient leverage for significant concessions. The limited license scenario reflects Trump's balanced approach tolerating competing views to test strategies. United States Cuba policy failures since 1959, a BRICS+ payment systems development would potentially render sanctions ineffective by the late 2020s. Venezuela's intensified relations with Iran, China, and Russia could further diminish United States influence. 

Several license scenarios have distinct implications for Grenell and Rubio's job performance, political futures and reactions, reflecting their competing visions for United States Venezuela policy. A full renewal would validate Grenell's engagement strategy, enhancing his influence within the Trump administration. It would provide significant leverage for negotiations such as El Salvador and deal or further detainee releases, countering China's influence. Grenell's performance would likely improve, as he could focus on diplomatic breakthroughs, though he would need to navigate internal tensions with Rubio. His political future would be bolstered, positioning him as a key player in Trump's foreign policy. Moreover; a full renewal contradicts Rubio's isolationist approach, risking backlash from his Florida base who align with Meda's hardline stance. It could weaken his influence within the administration as Trump's decision would favor Grenell. Rubio's performance might face strain as he would need to manage political fallout and internal tensions, diverting focus from other priorities like NATO alliances. Rubio's political future could be strained, though he might mitigate this by doubling down on other hardline policies.

Expiration would strip Grenell of a key bargaining check, reducing his ability to secure concessions like deportations or detainee releases. El Salvador deal would likely collapse, as Maduro would have little incentive to cooperate. Grenell's performance would suffer as his diplomatic efforts stall, forcing him to redirect focus to other roles like the California wildfires response. His political future would face challenges, as critics might blame his divided attention for the failure. Expiration aligns with Rubio's maximum pressure strategy, bolstering his credibility among Florida voters and antisocialist Republicans. It would enhance his influence within the administration as Trump's decision would favor his approach. Rubio's performance would improve, allowing him to focus on implementing his broader foreign policy vision, though he would need to manage fallout: like increased migration and China's influence. His political future would be strengthened, though long-term criticism for exacerbating Venezuela's crisis could emerge.

Limited license for minimal maintenance ensures Chevron remains in Venezuela, preserving some leverage for Grenell's engagement strategy. He could continue negotiating smaller concessions such as individual detainee releases, though the restricted scope limits his bargaining power compared to a full renewal. Grenell's performance could stabilize as he adapts to the limitations, potentially intensifying negotiations to maximize leverage. His political future remains strong as the license validates his approach, though he'll need to advocate for additional incentives. Grenell's estimated success probability is 60%: the limited license contradicts Rubio's goal of complete isolation as Chevron's continued presence provides some economic relief to the Venezuelan government. Rubio's Florida base might perceive this as a failure, straining his political standing. Rubio's performance might face short term strain as he manages base criticism and internal tensions, though he can frame the license's restrictions as limiting Maduro's gains, redirecting focus to other hardline initiatives. Rubio's estimated success probability is 40%

The limited license scenario favors Grenell, it preserves engagement but does not fully isolate Venezuela. Trump's balanced approach avoids a clear win lose outcome though gains a slight edge. Magalli Meda, a prominent Venezuelan opposition activist, has been vocal in her criticism of Venezuelan government and United States policy missing legal considerations within Venezuela. She made a statement at a United States press conference which reads "Diplomacy has not been up to the task. They have behaved cowardly, when we are living under tyranny. We need brave men and women in these positions, otherwise they should not take on that responsibility. The diplomats in Caracas must know that they can save lives. They should stop going to cocktail parties and applauding criminals". 

Meda publicized her case at the expense of other political prisoners, to maintain operational effectiveness. Moderate opposition figures like Enrique Capriles, who became a congressman on May 25th 20125, may feel alienated by Meda's radical rhetoric, which frames engagement as complicity, deepening the opposition's divide internationally. Meda's emotionally charged language appeals to radicals but lacks nuance, while Rubio's hardline rhetoric despite alignment with Meda and Machado is more acceptable, due to his official role. The Venezuelan National Assembly controlled by Socialist Party has discussed revoking citizenship for opposition figures accused of betraying the homeland, often targeting citizenship for opposition figures accused of betraying the homeland, targeting those supporting foreign sanctions or intervention. Historical proposals include the 2017 law against hatred which discussed penalties for inciting hatred, or supporting foreign intervention with citizenship revocation considered but not formalized. 

In 2021 Diosdado Cabello suggested amending the constitution to revoke citizenship for traitors like Machado, but article 35 guarantees of inalienable citizenship blocked this. After 2024 election, Jorge Rodriguez accused González and Machado of treason for seeking foreign recognition, suggesting citizenship revocation. May 25th 2025 regional and national assembly elections could lead to constitutional reforms later this year, but potentially removing article 35's protections to Meda's US statements, including calling Chevron a criminal organization and criticizing diplomats, align with the government's definition of treason. Her United States presence and association with Machado make her a target, especially with upcoming reforms, though international backlash could complicate implementation. Meda and Machado's lack of political allies post election, relying on Rubio for relevance, heightens their vulnerability. 

We now turn to BRICS+ impact on United States Venezuela policy. BRICS+ refers to the expanded grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and additional partner countries, which has evolved into a significant platform for non-western economies to challenge United States global financial systems. Venezuela while not a formal member has actively sought integration into BRICS+. The block's focus on the dollarization alternative payment systems and economic cooperation offers Venezuela a pathway to mitigate United States sanctions, access financing and strengthen ties with key allies like China and Russia. Key BRICS+ developments relevant to Venezuela include economic and financial mechanisms such as securing financing through the new development bank, and conducting trade in non dollar currencies, which are critical for sustaining oil production and acquiring technology amidst sanctions. Furthermore BRICS+ serves as a sandbox for non United States dollars instruments, including payment systems, cryptocurrencies and barter trade, which could render United States sanctions less effective over time, as seen with Russia's ability to circumvent sanctions since 2014.

At the 16th bBRICS+ summit in Kazan October 2024, Nicolás Maduro met with Vladimir Putin who endorsed Venezuela's membership aspirations, reaffirming their strategic partnership, which aligns with Venezuela's interest in transforming oil and gas development rights to BRICS+ countries. The summit emphasized lifting sanctions and revitalizing international financial systems, with Maduro advocating for a new BRICS+ bank and payment system to counter United States aggression. These developments position BRICS+ as a pivotal factor in Venezuela's strategy to reduce reliance on the United States financial system, directly impacting the effectiveness of United States policy tools like sanctions and the Chevron license debate. BRICS+ impacts United States Venezuela policy dynamics by reducing the effectiveness of United States sanctions, which have been a cornerstone of Rubio's maximum pressure strategy, as seen in his push to let Chevron's OFAC license expire.

BRICS+ offers Venezuela alternatives that undermine this approach. Dedollarization and financial alternatives such as digital currencies and barter trade allow Venezuelans to bypass swift and other United States controlled financial systems, following Russia's model since 2014. Access to new development bank financing reduces dependency on Western institutions, which have restricted Venezuela's access due to sanctions. Trade with BRICS+ countries, in particular China's increasing oil purchases, provide economic lifelines that diminish the leverage of United States sanctions. BRICS+ weakens Rubio's isolationist strategy as Maduro can pivot to BRICS+ partners, even with a limited Chevron license, reducing the economic pressure Rubio aims to exert. 

This aligns with concerns that BRICS+ payment systems, expected to mature later this decade, could render sanctions absolutely meaningless, potentially making United States foreign policy less relevant. Moreover BRICS+ strengthens Venezuela's geopolitical alliances, enhancing its strategic partnerships with China, Russia and other non-Western powers, shifting the geopolitical balance in Latin America. Venezuela's reliance on China and Russia has grown due to United States sanctions and global energy shifts with China's oil purchases, and Russia's endorsement of BRICS+ membership providing critical support. Venezuela's intensified relations with Iran alongside China and Russia further diversify its alliances, leveraging Iran's experience in evading United States sanctions through alternative trade networks.

Kazan Summit's focus on a new international financing system amplifies Venezuela's voice among global South nations, reducing its isolation and making Venezuela less reliant on United States cooperation. This reduces Grenell's leverage in negotiations as Maduro can leverage BRICS+ support to offset economic losses from a limited Chevron license potentially stalling deals, like the Salvadoran exchange. The limited license scenario allowing for minimal maintainance is influenced by BRICS+ in several ways, with BRICS+ providing economic alternatives, the limited license offers Maduro minimal relief but doesn't significantly alter his reliance on China and Russia, weakening Grenell's bargaining power. if Chevron's operations are curtailed China is likely to increase its oil purchases, facilitated by BRICS+ trade mechanisms in non United States dollar currencies, undermining the strategic importance of Chevron's presence, which Grenell argues counters China.

Rubio's strategy of isolating Maduro through economic pressure is less effective if BRICS+ provides alternatives, as the limited license still allows Chevron to remain which Rubio opposes, but BRICS+ ensures Maduro's economic survival, regardless of diminishing the impact of Rubio's maximum pressure approach. The implication is that BRICS+ reduces the strategic significance of the Chevron license debate, limiting the United States ability to influence Venezuela through economic means, impacting Grenell's engagement strategy by diminishing his leverage. Maduro can afford to reject United States demands unless Grenell offers significant incentives beyond Chevron's minimal operations. El Salvador deal may stall if Maduro prioritizes BRICS+ partnerships, and Grenell's performance could stabilize with a limited license, but his ability to secure major concessions is limited, potentially forcing him to focus on smaller wins. His political future remains strong as he can frame the license as a win for engagement, but long-term success depends on countering BRICS+ influence through alternative strategies. 

For Rubio BRICS+ undermines his isolationist isolationist strategy, as it reduces the impact of United States sanctions straining his political standing if his base perceives the limited license as a failure: his performance faces pressure and his long-term future depends on navigating these challenges potentially, leveraging other foreign policy wins. BRICS+ offers economic relief, potentially stabilizing the Venezuelan government led by Nicolas Maduro. For example, new development bank financing could sustain oil production. BRICS+ prioritizes economic cooperation over democratic reforms. The United States aims to promote regime change, maintain energy security, counter adversarial influence and manage migration; however, BRICS+ complicates these goals by reducing United States leverage and strengthening Venezuela's ties with nonwestern powers. As BRICS+ payment systems mature, United States sanctions may become less effective, potentially making United States foreign policy less relevant to the region, underscoring the need for a nuanced approach to navigate Venezuela's multiaceted challenges.

Burkina Faso is another case of potential BRICS+ membership, aiming to prevail against sanctions. Burkina Faso and Venezuela have cultivated a growing relationship in recent years, rooted in shared anti-imperialist ideologies and mutual support against Western influence. This bond was notably highlighted by a bilateral meeting between President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and President Ibrahim Troré of Burkina Faso on May 9th 2025 during Russia's Victory day celebrations in Moscow. They discussed enhancing cooperation in energy security and technology, focusing on bilateral ties and global challenges. Both leaders participated in a ceremony at the Simón Bolívar monument emphasizing their solidarity. Troré who is typically reserved smiled while shaking hands with Maduro at the Burkina Faso embassy in Moscow. Maduro reportedly praised Traoré as Africa's hero for his anti-imperialist stance. The Maduro Traoré meeting built on a foundation of diplomatic ideological and emerging economic ties between Burkina Faso and Venezuela: they consistently back each other in international forums.

Venezuela has supported Burkina Faso's sovereignty against the Western intervention, notably after the 2023 expulsion of French troops. Burkina Faso in turn has endorsed Venezuela's resistance to United States sanctions at the United Nations. Both nations share an anti-imperialist worldview. Traoré emphasizes pan-Africanism and sovereignty, echoing the legacy of Burkina Faso's revolutionary leader. Maduro's socialist government champions anti United States rhetoric, drawing parallels to Latin America's independence hero Simón Bolivar. This ideological synergy was evident in their Moscow meeting. Trade between the two countries is currently limited but there is potential for growth. Venezuela's expertise in oil production could aid Burkina Faso's mining sector, particularly in gold: a key export. Conversely Burkina Faso's agricultural knowledge could support Venezuela's efforts to address food shortages amid economic challenges.

Discussions during the 2025 meeting reportedly explored strategic energy and technological collaboration, with Venezuelan offering oil related expertise and Burkina Faso seeking innovations for its resource sectors. Both nations face internal threats: jihadist insurgencies in Burkina Feso, and political instability in Venezuela. While specifics are scarce, their talks may have included military or intelligence sharing prospects, possibly facilitated by Russia. Symbolic ties reinforce a narrative of resistance against colonial and neocolonial powers: Burkina Faso and Venezuela align with Russia within the BRICS+ framework: both seek alternatives to western dominated systems, with Russia providing military and economic support including arms, and Wagner group assistance to Burkina Faso and oil partnerships in Venezuela. Burkina Faso and Venezuela bilateral meeting reflects a commitment to South South cooperation, with Maduro reportedly emphasizing bridges between Africa and South America. 

This aligns with the efforts to reduce reliance on Western aid and sanctions laden economies. While no formal agreements were publicly announced, the meeting likely laid groundwork for future collaboration potential areas, including energy projects, security packs or coordinated positions in BRICS+ and the non aligned movement. Traoré's rejection of French influence and Maduro's defiance of United States sanctions positioned them as part of a broader anti-western block, bolstered by Russia and China and challenged by internal instability. Burkina Faso faces a security crisis and Venezuela faces economic decay, limiting their capacity for robust cooperation.

Western pressure including sanctions further constrains their ambitions. Meeting between presidents Maduro and Traoré builds on their shared anti-imperialist stance, diplomatic solidarity and emerging strategic ties, with the flags of their countries symbolizing mutual recognition. While not widely publicized the event reflects a deepening alliance within the BRICS+ orbit, aimed at countering western dominance. Future prospects hinge on overcoming internal challenges and leveraging their alignment with Russia, through concrete outcomes from the meeting remain to be fully realized.